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Abstract
There are many cryptographic constructions in which one uses a random power or multiple
of an element in a group or a ring. We describe a fast method to compute random powers and
multiples in certain important situations including powers in the Galois 0eld F2n , multiples on
Koblitz elliptic curves, and multiples in NTRU convolution polynomial rings. The underlying
idea is to form a random exponent or multiplier as a product of factors, each of which has low
Hamming weight when expanded as a sum of powers of some fast operation.
? 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
0. Introduction
There are many cryptographic constructions in which one uses a random power or
multiple of an element of a group or a ring. A brief and far from complete list includes:
Di#e–Hellman key exchange: One takes an element g in a 0nite 0eld F and com-
putes a random power gk in F. Here k is an integer.
Elliptic Curve DH key exchange: One takes a point P in the group E(F) of points
on an elliptic curve over a 0nite 0eld and computes a random multiple kP. Here k
may be an integer or a more general endomorphism of the group E(F).
DSS and ECDSS: The digital signature standard (using a 0nite 0eld or an ellip-
tic curve) requires a random power gk or multiple kP in the signing portion of the
algorithm. The veri0cation process also require a power or multiple, but for speci0ed
values of k, not random values.
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Classical ElGamal public key cryptosystem: ElGamal key generation requires com-
putation of a power = j with a 0xed base  and a randomly chosen exponent j that
forms the secret key. Encryption requires computation of two powers k and k to a
randomly chosen exponent k. Decryption requires computation of a power 	j.
Elliptic curve ElGamal and variants: Key generation requires computation of a
multiple Q = jP with a 0xed point P in E(F) and a randomly chosen multiplier j
that forms the secret key. Encryption requires computation of two multiples kP and
kQ to a randomly chosen multiplier k. Decryption requires computation of a multiple
jR. Again k may be an integer or a more general endomorphism of the group E(F).
NTRU public key cryptosystem: The public key includes a random polynomial f(X )
in the ring Rq = (Z=qZ)[X ]=(XN − 1) of truncated polynomials modulo q. Encryption
requires computation of a product r(X )h(X ) in the ring R, where h(X ) (the public key)
is 0xed and r(X ) is random. Decryption requires computation of a product f(X )e(X )
in the ring R, where e(X ) is the ciphertext.
In this note we describe a general method that in many situations allows random
multiples to be computed more rapidly than previously described methods. Although
not universally applicable, it can be used for many of the algorithms in the above
list, including DiJe–Hellman over Galois 0elds F2n , elliptic curve cryptography over
Koblitz curves, and the NTRU cryptosystem.
BrieKy, our idea is to write the random multiplier as a product of terms, each of
which is a sum of terms that are relatively easily computed. We call these multipliers
small Hamming weight products (SHWP), because each term in the product has low
Hamming weight relative to an easily computed operation.
1. Low Hamming weight exponents
In this section we describe some of the ways in which low Hamming weight expo-
nents have been used in cryptography and, more generally, as a computational tool.
The use of low Hamming weight exponents has been studied in both RSA expo-
nentiation [7] and in discrete logarithm algorithms [2,13], but always in the context
of taking a single exponent k of small Hamming weight. Our innovation is to use a
product k = k1k2 · · · kr of very low Hamming weight exponents and take advantage of
the fact that the sample space of the product k is more or less the product of the
sample spaces for k1; : : : ; kr , while the computational complexity (in certain situations)
of computing k is the sum of the computational complexity of computing kii .
There is a vast literature on the evaluation of powers in general, see for example,
[1, Section 1.2]; [3,6, Section 4.6.3] or [8, Section 14.6]. The usual binary method
to compute xk requires approximately log2 k squarings and HW(k) multiplications,
where
HW(k) = Hamming weight of k
is the number of ones in the binary expansion of k. The use of addition chains for k
will often yield an improvement, although for very large values of k it is diJcult to
0nd optimal chains.
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We also mention an idea of Schnorr [10] to compute random powers by precomput-
ing a list of powers, taking a product of a random subset, and gradually supplementing
the list using intermediate calculations. Schnorr’s method was broken by de Rooij [9]
at the parameter levels suggested in [10].
Another method that is closer to the ideas in this paper is the factor method, which
is brieKy discussed in [6, Section 4.6.3, p. 463, Exercise 3]. The idea is to write k
as a product k = uv and compute z = xk as y = xu and z = yv. The process may be
repeated and interspersed with the binary method or the use of other addition chains.
To illustrate the idea, let G be a group in which we want to compute the quantity
xk . Suppose that we write the exponent k as a sum of products
k =
d∑
i=1
ki =
d∑
i=1
Ni∏
n=1
Ki;n: (1)
We compute xk as the product
∏
i x
ki , we compute each power xki using the factor
method with ki =
∏
n Ki;n, and we compute each power y
Ki; n by using (say) the binary
method. This requires approximately log2(k) squarings and approximately
d− 1 +
d∑
i=1
Ni∑
n=1
(HW(Ki;n)− 1) multiplications: (2)
For small values of k, one might ask for decomposition (1) that minimizes (2). For
larger values of k, one might ask for an algorithm that produces a reasonably small
value of (2). These both are very interesting questions, but are not the focus of the
present paper.
Both the goals and the analysis in this paper di&er signi0cantly from the material
on exponentiation described in [6]. The goal in [6] is to describe eJcient methods for
computing xk for a given exponent k. The subsequent analysis gives theoretical upper
and lower bounds for the most eJcient method and algorithms for taking a given k
and 0nding a reasonably eJcient way to evaluate xk . Our goal in this paper is to
0nd a collection of exponents k such that xk is easy to compute and such that the
collection is suJciently “random” and suJciently large. The seemingly minor change
in perspective from speci0c exponents to random exponents actually represents a major
shift in the underlying questions and in the methods that are used to study them.
There is a second important way in which our work di&ers from the factor method as
described in [6]. We will concentrate on situations in which there is a “free” operation.
We illustrate this point with an example. Let G be a group and suppose that we want
to compute xk using the factor method, where k = uv. The cost of computing xk is
approximately
(log2(k) squarings) + (HW(u) + HW(v) multiplications);
where we assume for simplicity that the two powers y = xu and z = yv are computed
using the binary method. Now suppose that the (0nite) group G has order N and
suppose that we merely write k as a product modulo N , say k ≡ uv (modN ). Then
y = xu and z = yv will still give us the correct value z = xk , but now the cost is
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approximately
(log2(uv) squarings) + HW(u) + HW(v) multiplications:
If squaring and multiplication take approximately the same amount of time, then this
method will probably be very bad because the product uv will be very large.
On the other hand, if squaring is very fast, as it is for example in the Galois 0eld
F2n , then large values of u and v may be advantageous as long as u and v have small
(binary) Hamming weight. This is the other idea that we will develop in this paper in
three situations of cryptographic interest, namely exponentiation in Galois 0elds F2n ,
multiplication on Koblitz elliptic curves, and multiplication in NTRU convolution rings
Fq[X ]=(XN − 1). These speci0c situations are described in detail in Sections 2–4. In
Section 5 we discuss some of the issues surrounding the randomness of SHWP and
describe some computations and experiments. Finally, in Section 6, we give a general
formulation.
2. Random powers in Galois elds F2n
In any group, the standard way to compute a power k is to use the binary expansion
of k, see for example [1, Section 1.2] or [8, Section 14.6]. This reduces the computation
of k to approximately log2(k) squarings and HW(k) multiplications, where on average
HW(k) equals approximately 12 log2(k). (Using a signed binary expansion of k [8,
Section 14.7.1] further reduces the number of multiplications, at the expense of an
inversion.)
Binary powering algorithms apply to any group, but the feature we wish to exploit
in F2n is the fact that squaring is essentially free compared to multiplication. Thus
if k is randomly chosen in the interval from 1 to 2n − 1, then computation of k is
dominated by the approximately n=2 multiplications that are required.
As indicated above, there are many cryptographic situations in which a person needs
to compute k for a 0xed base  and some randomly chosen exponent k. Generally, a
requirement is that k be chosen from a suJciently large set that an exhaustive search
(or more generally, a square root search such as Pollard’s rho method) will be unable
to determine k. Thus suppose that one chooses k to have the form
k =
n−1∑
i=0
ki2i with ki ∈{0; 1}
with a 0xed binary Hamming weight d =
∑
ki. Then the size of the search space of
k is ( nd). One typically wants the search space to have at least 2
160 elements, since
the running time will typically be proportional to the square root of the size of this
space. More precisely, see [13] for a description of Coppersmith’s baby-step giant-step
algorithm to eJciently search this space in time proportional to
√
t( n=2d=2 ).
For cryptographic purposes, a typical value for n is n ≈ 1000, which is dictated by
the running time of sieve and index calculus methods for solving the discrete logarithm
problem over F2n . Then taking d= 25 gives a search space of size ( 100025 ) ≈ 2165, and
computation of k requires 24 multiplications.
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The new method we propose in this paper is to choose k to be a product of terms
with very low binary Hamming weight. (More generally, one might use a sum of such
products.) To illustrate with the above value n ≈ 1000, suppose that we take k to have
the form
k = k(1)k(2)k(3);
where k(1) has binary Hamming weight 6 and k(2) and k(3) each have binary Hamming
weight 7. Then the search space for k, which is the product of the search spaces for
the three factors, has order ( 10006 )
1000
7 )(
1000
7 ) ≈ 2165, while computation of
k = ((k
(1)
)k
(2)
)k
(3)
requires only
5 + 6 + 6 = 17 multiplications:
This represents a savings of approximately 29%.
Remark 1. We required a search space of order approximately 2160, since the standard
square root search attacks [13] reduce the time to O(280). However, if k is a product of
several low Hamming weight polynomials, it is not clear to us how to set up a square
root attack on the full space. Thus, if k = k(1)k(2)k(3), one can search (guess) the 0rst
two terms and then use a square root attack for the third term. A second approach to
solving k =  for k is to transfer k(3) to the other side. Thus we let i run through the
space of all products k(1)k(2) and let j run through the space of all k(3) values and we
make tables of the values of i and j
−1
, where j−1 is the inverse of jmodulo 2n − 1.
Then the running time is proportional to the sum of the sizes of the two tables.
In the example given above, this yields a running time proportional to(
1000
6
)(
1000
7
)
+
(
1000
7
)
≈ 2107:7:
However, in view of this search method, it makes more sense to take k(3) consider-
ably larger than k(1) and k(2). Thus, if we take k(1), k(2) and k(3) to have Hamming
weights 2, 2, 11, respectively, then the 0rst square root attack has time O(280:0) and
the second square root attack has time O(284:3), and computation of k requires only
12 multiplications. (We thank Don Coppersmith for showing us the second square root
attack described in this remark.)
Remark 2. We have described how to use SHWP over 0elds with 2n elements, but
similar remarks apply to 0elds with pn elements using multipliers of the form ±pe1 ±
· · · ± per .
3. Random multiples on Koblitz elliptic curves
Let E=F2m be an elliptic curve de0ned over the 0eld with 2m elements, and let
P ∈E(F2m) be a point on the curve. A number of cryptographic constructions require
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the computation of a multiple NP, where N has size comparable to 2m. (See, e.g.
[4,8,12].) Writing N in binary form as
N = N0 + 2N1 + 4N2 + · · ·+ 2iNi + · · ·+ 2mNm with N0; : : : ; Nm ∈{0; 1};
the computation of NP is reduced to approximately N=2 doublings and N=2 point ad-
ditions. As already indicated, further savings may be obtained by choosing N0; : : : ; Nm
in the set {−1; 0; 1}, reducing the number of additions to approximately N=3. Unfortu-
nately, on elliptic curves, doubling a point is computationally more diJcult than adding
two di&erent points.
For certain elliptic curves, it is possible to signi0cantly reduce the necessary com-
putation by replacing doubling with a Frobenius map that is essentially free. Let E=F2
be a “Koblitz curve”, that is, an ordinary elliptic curve de0ned over the 0eld with two
elements. Thus E is one of the two curves
E: y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + 1 with a∈ F2:
Let
# : E(F2m)→ E(F2m); #(x; y) = (x2; y2);
be the Frobenius map on E. The computation of #(Q) takes very little time compared
to point addition or doubling on E. It is possible to write any integer N as a linear
combination
N = N0 + #N1 + #2N2 + · · ·+ #iNi + · · ·+ #mNm
with N0; : : : ; Nm ∈{−1; 0; 1};
and then the computation of NP is essentially reduced to m=3 additions in E(F2m).
(Approximately m=3 of the Ni’s will be nonzero.) Further, for many cryptographic
applications there is no real reason to use integer multiples of P; one can simply
use multiples NP where N is a random linear combination of powers of # as above.
For example, DiJe–Hellman key exchange works perfectly well. See [4,11] for basic
material and computational methods on Koblitz curves.
To summarize, computation of a random signed #-multiple of a point on a Koblitz
curve over F2m requires approximately m=3 elliptic curve additions. We now describe a
way to signi0cantly reduce the number of elliptic curve additions. As indicated above,
the basic idea is to choose the multiplier N to be a product of low Hamming weight
linear combinations of #.
For concreteness, we illustrate the idea with a particular 0eld of cryptographic in-
terest. We let m=163, so we are working in the 0eld F2163 . We choose N to have the
form
N = N (1)N (2)N (3) =
(
1 +
6∑
u=1
± #iu
)(
1 +
6∑
u=1
± #ju
)(
1 +
6∑
u=1
± #ku
)
:
(We take each factor in the indicated form, since one can always pull o& a power of
# from each factor. Using this form prevents overcounting.)
First we check how hard it is, given Q = NP, to perform a search for N or for
some other integer N ′ satisfying N ′P=Q. A square root search (e.g., Pollard rho) for
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N ′ takes on the order of
√
2163 steps. A second search, which takes advantage of the
special form of N , is to write the equation Q = NP as
(N (3))−1Q = N (1)N (2)P
and compare tables of values of the two sides. The time and space requirement for
this search is the length of the longer of the two tables. For our example, each of the
N (i)’s is taken from a space of size 26( 1626 ) ≈ 240:4, so the table of values of N (1)N (2)P
has O(280) elements. Finally, one could try guessing the values of N (1) and N (2) and
perform a square root search for N (3), but this gives an even larger search space.
The advantage of taking N in the above form is clear. Computation of the multiple
NP = N (1)N (2)N (3)P
requires only 6+6+6=18 elliptic curve additions. (Subtractions are essentially the same
as additions.) It also requires many applications of powers of the Frobenius map #,
but these take very little time compared to point additions, so may be neglected in this
rough analysis. We thus see that with this new method, a useful cryptographic multiple
NP may be computed using 18 additions, rather than the approximately 163=3 ≈ 54
additions required by the earlier method. This yields a three-fold speed increase.
Remark 3. We do not see a meet-in-the-middle attack on all of N , but even if such an
attack exists, it suJces to replace the weights (6; 6; 6) above with the weights (8; 9; 9)
to get a set of triples (N (1); N (2); N (3)) of order 2163:9. The computation of NP now
requires 26 additions, yielding a speed increase by a factor of approximately 2.1.
Actually, in this situation it is even faster to use a product of four terms
N = N (1)N (2)N (3)N (4) with weights (4; 5; 7; 8). Then the total search space has size
24
(
162
4
)
25
(
162
5
)
27
(
162
7
)
28
(
162
8
)
≈ 2160:48;
and the computation of NP requires only 24 additions for a speed increase by a factor
of approximately 2.26.
Remark 4. One might instead take N to be a sum of products of small Hamming
weight terms. For example, N = N (1)N (2) + N (3)N (4) with the four terms having small
Hamming weight. Of course, this allows a square root attack for the two halves of N
by matching values of aP with values of Q − bP.
Remark 5. If one wants N to be an actual integer, rather than a polynomial in #, one
can include conjugate terms. For example, an expression of the form
#i + #m−i
represents an integer, and it is a simple matter to compute and store a table of values
of #i + #m−i for 16 i¡m=2.
Remark 6. This brings up the very interesting problem of whether one can eJciently
0nd a small #-Hamming weight multiplier system for a given integer N . We leave the
precise formulation and study of this problem for a future paper.
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4. NTRU public key cryptosystem
The NTRU public key cryptosystem uses truncated polynomials in the ring
R=
(Z=qZ)[X ]
(XN − 1) :
The encryption process includes computation of a product r(X )h(X ) for a 0xed public
key polynomial h(X ) and a randomly chosen polynomial r(X ) having small coeJcients.
The decryption process similarly includes computation of a product f(X )e(X ), where
e(X ) is the ciphertext and the private key f(X ) is a polynomial with small coeJcients.
For further details, see [5].
In general, a computation a(X )b(X ) in the ring R is a convolution product of the
vectors of coeJcients of a and b. The naive algorithm to compute this convolution is
N 2 steps, where each step is an addition and a multiplication. (If a(X ) has coeJcients
that are randomly distributed in {−1; 0; 1}, then the computation takes about 2N=3
steps, where now a step is simply an addition or a subtraction.) Other methods such as
Karatsuba multiplication or FFT techniques (if applicable) reduce this to O(N logN )
steps, although the big-O constant may be moderately large.
Applying the ideas already described above, we can compute a small random multiple
of h(X ) as a product
r(1)(X )r(2)(X ) · · · r(t)(X )h(X );
where each r(i)(X ) has only a few nonzero terms. Then the amount of computation
needed is proportional to the sum of the number of nonzero terms, while the size of
the sample space is approximately equal to the product of the sample spaces for the
r(i).
We illustrate with this a speci0c example. Let N = 251 and take
r(X ) = r(1)(X )r(2)(X );
where r(1) and r(2) are polynomials with exactly eight nonzero coeJcients, four 1’s
and four −1’s. To avoid too much duplication, we also require that r(i)(0)=1, so only
three of the 1’s are randomly placed. Then the number of such r(X ) polynomials is
approximately(
250
3
)(
247
4
)(
250
3
)(
247
4
)
1
2
≈ 295:94:
If one tries to guess r(1)(X ) and then use a square root search for r(2)(X ), this leads
to a search algorithm of length approximately(
250
3
)(
247
4
)√√√√( 250
3
)(
247
4
)
1
2
≈ 271:1:
The computation of the product r(X )h(X ) is reduced to approximately 16N additions
and subtractions. Notice that r(X ) itself has about 64 nonzero coeJcients, so a direct
computation of r(X )h(X ) requires almost 4 times as many elementary operations.
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A similar construction can be used for the NTRU private key f(X ), leading to a
similar computational speedup for decryption.
5. Randomness of SHWP
In this section we examine the question of the extent to which a product of small
Hamming weight elements may be considered random. There are many ways of mea-
suring randomness (see for example [6]). We will consider the products described in
Section 4 and will study products of low Hamming weight polynomials. For concrete-
ness, let
BN (D) = {binary polynomials of degree N − 1 with D ones}:
That is, elements of BN (D) are polynomials
a0 + a1X + a2X 2 + · · ·+ aN−1XN−1
with ai ∈{0; 1} and
∑
ai = D. As described in Section 4, we multiply polynomials
using the convolution rule XN = 1.
Products of polynomials are subject to a natural rotation of their coeJcients by
multiplying by powers of X . In other words, we can rewrite any product as
a(X ) ∗ b(X ) = (X k ∗ a(X )) ∗ (XN−k ∗ b(X )):
Such rotations are far from random, so it makes sense to discourage them in our sample
spaces. We thus de0ne
B∗N (D) = {a(X ) = a0 + a1X + · · ·+ aN−1XN−1 ∈BN (D): a0 = 1}
to be the subset of BN (D) consisting of polynomials whose constant coeJcient is
nonzero.
We wish to compare the space of random binary polynomials B∗N (D) with the space
of products
P∗N (d1; d2) = {c(X ) = a(X ) ∗ b(X ):
a(X )∈B∗N (d1); b(X )∈B∗N (d2); c(X )∈B∗N (d1d2)}:
Notice that we are only considering polynomials a(X ) and b(X ) whose product a(X )∗
b(X ) is binary. In practice, this may mean generating a number of pairs (a; b) at
random, multiplying them, and discarding the product if it is not of the appropriate
form. (This is what we did in our experiments.)
How might one compare the set of products P∗N (d1; d2) with the truly random set
B∗N (d1d2)? In general, the former set will be much smaller than the latter set, so we
cannot say that each element of B∗N (d1d2) is equally likely to be hit by an element
of P∗N (d1; d2). Experimentally, we can say that elements of P
∗
N (d1; d2) generally have
a unique representation as a product, but this is only a weak measure of randomness.
So we will use Hamming weight di&erences to study the extent to which elements
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of P∗N (d1; d2) are randomly distributed in the space B
∗
N (d1d2). For any two binary
polynomials a(X ) and b(X ), we de0ne their Hamming weight di/erence to be
HWD(a; b) = #{i: ai = bi}:
It is easy to compute the probability that a randomly chosen pair in B∗N (D) will have
a given Hamming weight di&erence. More precisely, for any 0xed a∈B∗N (D), if we
ignore the known constant coeJcient, there are D− 1 ones and N −D zeros. Suppose
that b∈BN (D) has k of its ones in common with the ones of a. Then HWD(a; b)
gains D − 1− k from the ones in a that are hit by zeros of b and it gains D − 1− k
from the ones of b that hit zeros of a, so HWD(a; b)=2(D−1−k). Thus the Hamming
weight di&erence is always even and it will equal 2 ∗ h when exactly D− 1− h of the
ones of a and b coincide. Dividing the number of ways that this can happen by the
total number of polynomials, we 0nd that for a 0xed a∈B∗N (D), the probability that
a randomly chosen b∈B∗N (D) is Hamming weight distance 2 ∗ h from a is given by
Prob
b∈B∗N (D)
(HWD(a; b) = 2 ∗ h) =
( D−1
D−1−h
)(N−D
h
)
(N−1
D−1
) : (3)
It seems more diJcult to compute exactly the analogous probability for a randomly
chosen b∈P∗N (d1; d2), so we resort to computer simulation. We performed the follow-
ing experiments. We randomly chose 10,000 polynomials from the sets
B=B∗251(64) and P=P
∗
251(8; 8):
We computed the distributions of Hamming weight di&erences HWD(a; b) for all 108
pairs (a; b) chosen from each of the sets B × B, B × P, and P × P. The results
are listed in Table 1, together with the theoretical expected value from formula (3). It
seems clear from the table that there is no discernable di&erence in HWD(a; b) in the
various situations studied.
6. A general formulation of SHWP
All of the above constructions can be formulated quite generally in terms of a ring
R, an R-module M , and a subset S ⊂ R with the two properties:
(A) The set S is “suJciently large”.
(B) The computation of products r ·m for r ∈ S and m∈M is “computationally easy”.
These conditions are, to some extent, antagonistic to one another, since presumably the
larger the set S, the harder on average it is to compute products r · m for r ∈ S.
One way to construct the set S is to choose a collection of smaller subsets S1; : : : ; St ⊂
R and let
S = {r1 · · · rt : r1 ∈ S1; : : : ; rt ∈ St}:
Under suitable hypotheses, the size of the set S is approximately the product of the
sizes of S1; : : : ; St . (See the remark below.) Obviously, we want each Si to satisfy
condition (B).
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Table 1
Hamming weight di&erence probabilities
Hamming wt Experimental Theoretical
di&erence B vs. B B vs. P P vs. P B vs. B
(%) (%) (%) (%)
68 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
70 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
72 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.019
74 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.057
76 0.155 0.155 0.158 0.155
78 0.380 0.380 0.381 0.379
80 0.841 0.843 0.841 0.841
82 1.692 1.691 1.688 1.691
84 3.079 3.082 3.074 3.080
86 5.072 5.071 5.063 5.072
88 7.542 7.539 7.537 7.545
90 10.121 10.118 10.123 10.124
92 12.234 12.228 12.236 12.229
94 13.265 13.271 13.287 13.270
96 12.904 12.901 12.917 12.901
98 11.209 11.208 11.200 11.203
100 8.660 8.657 8.653 8.658
102 5.928 5.929 5.923 5.928
104 3.578 3.581 3.572 3.578
106 1.889 1.891 1.888 1.892
108 0.867 0.869 0.868 0.869
110 0.343 0.343 0.345 0.344
112 0.115 0.115 0.117 0.116
114 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.033
116 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008
118 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Proceeding further, suppose that there is one particular element #∈R such that the
product # ·m is easy to compute for every m∈M . Then a natural choice for the Si are
low Hamming weight polynomials in #; that is, Si might consist of all elements of r
of the form
#j1 + #j2 + · · ·+ #jd
for some 0xed d= di (or for some random d6Di for a 0xed Di). Of course, if it is
easy to compute inverses −m, then one can increase the size of Si by using
±#j1 ± #j2 ± · · · ± #jd :
Similarly, if there are several easy-to-multiply elements #1; : : : ; #u ∈R, then one can take
low Hamming weight polynomials in the u “variables” #1; : : : ; #u, further increasing the
size of the special sets Si.
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We can relate this general formulation to the earlier examples in this note.
1. Powers in F2n : The ring is R=Z, the R-module is the multiplicative group M =F∗2n ,
and the special map # is the doubling (i.e., squaring) map #() = 2.
2. Multiples on Koblitz curves: The ring is R= End(E(F2m)) (i.e., the ring of homo-
morphism from E(F2m) to itself), the R-module is M =E(F2m), and the special map
# is the Frobenius map #(x; y) = (x2; y2).
3. The NTRU cryptosystem: The ring is R=Z[X ]=(XN − 1), the R-module is M = R
(i.e., R acts on itself via multiplication), and the special map # is the multiplication-
by-X map #(f(X )) = Xf(X ).
This makes clear how SHWP apply to these particular situations and also give some
indication of the widespread applicability of the general idea.
Remark 7. We partially quantify our remark concerning the size of S, where the set
S is the image of the map
S1 × S2 × · · · × St → R; (r1; r2; : : : ; rt) → r1r2 · · · rt :
In practice, it is usually not hard to describe a natural set T ⊂ R with the property that
S ⊂ T and with the property that a random t-tuple (r1; : : : ; rt) of S1 × · · · × St appears
to have an equal chance of hitting each element of T . (Note our choice of words. It
may be diJcult to rigorously prove that T has this property, but usually one can at
least obtain experimental evidence.) We write Ni = |Si| for the size of the set Si and
M = |T | for the size of the set T . Then elementary probability theory allows us to
estimate the expected number of distinct elements if we randomly choose N1N2 · · ·Nt
elements of T with replacement.
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